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1. VARIOUS VIEWS ON FOREIGN TRADE IN 
THE MID-TOKUGA W A PERIOD 
After the country was closed to foreigners in the Kanyei 
era, an exception was made of Nagasaki, where foreign 
trade was permitted though with China and Holland alone. 
As this trade arrangement was unilateral, in that Japan 
simply bought with her money what Chinese and Dutch 
ships brought to her shores, the outflow of Japanese gold 
and silver soon became so considerable that it was found 
,impossible to allow this state of affairs to continue un-
checked. Thus, trade witnessed an yearly decline. In such 
circumstances, it was no wonder that many people should 
have urged a further restrictions or total prohibition of 
trade. For example, Arai-Hakuseki ;m1t~:Q, a noted scholar-
statesman of the day, denounced foreign trade in the following 
terms: .. During the past 100 years, since foreign trade 
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was inaugurated under the Tokugawa regime, there has 
been a heavy outflow of Japanese money. Japan has already 
lost a fourth of her gold and three·fourth of her silver, so 
far as can be judged from the figures available. The actual 
loss of Japanese gold and silver must, however, be heavier 
than this, as the figures published do not cover all dis· 
bursements that have left the country. It is obvious that 
if this rate of outflow is maintained, Japanese currency will 
be exhausted within the next 100 years." He goes on to 
say: "It is poor policy to buy useless foreign goods with 
valuable Japanese money. In olden times, Japan got on 
very well without foreign goods. As a matter of fact, she 
is not dependent on foreign countries for anything except 
medical supplies. Even if foreign ships ceased to visit these 
shores, Japan would find no great difficulty in satisfying her 
own needs." Furthermore, regarding medical supplies, the 
importation of which was, in his opinion, the only benefit 
derivable from foreign trade, Hakuseki maintained that it 
was not absolutely necessary for Japan to resort to foreign 
countries for their supply. He pointed out that: "In olden 
times, many of the medicinal materials now being imported 
were produced in Japan. When it is recalled that cotton 
and tobacco which were formerly unknown in Japan are 
now cultivated throughout the country, there is no reason 
why other things which have never before been grown in 
this country should not be produced here, if seeds were 
imported and sown in suitable soil." In this way, he 
argued that it was not necessarily impossible for Japan to 
be self·sufficient. If it should seem difficult to abolish 
foreign trade all at once, he suggested, that appropriate 
measures of restriction should be adopted. His suggestion 
was that the volume of annual trade should be fixed after 
due consideration of the amount of money in circulation at 
home, and that the number and tonnage of foreign ships 
visiting this country should be restricted. The elaborate 
trade regulations which were enacted in the fifth year of 
Shotoku (1715) were conceived in sllch a spirit. Stressing 
.-:....., -----------------
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the value of precious metals, Hakuseki remarked: "Com-
paring them to the integral parts of the human body, cereals 
may be likened to hair, for they grow ceaselessly, while 
metals, like bones, are never replaced. Even cereal crops 
cannot be expected to be always abundant, furthermore the 
output varies with the nature of the soil. As for the 
metals, they are produced in only a few places and the 
annual production is variable." 
The opinion of Nakai-Chikuzan 'P'Il'1tllJ, another noted 
scholar, offers an interesting contrast with the above-men-
tioned view of Hakuseki. Chikuzan said: "Gold and silver 
are, after all, of no practical value, and therefore a scarcity 
of these metals causes us no serious inconvenience. On the 
contrary, copper and iron are of great use to the people. 
Iron is, needless to say, most important, and copper is the 
next most useful metal. It is, therefore, very regrettable 
that large quantities of copper are now annually given away 
to foreign countries." He contended that the country suf-
fered little from a heavy outflow of gold and silver, because 
these metals, unlike iron and copper, are of no practical 
use. People could not subsist on gold or silver, when they 
were hungry, nor could they wear them to keep them 
warm in cold weather. Houses could not be built of them; 
neither could arms, agricultural implements, or tools for 
commercial and industrial use, be made of them. On the 
other hand, he deeply deplored the heavy outflow of copper 
on the ground that this metal was of immense practical 
value, and suggested that a barter system should be adopted 
in order to check the extensive outflow. He pointed out 
that in addition to various marine products, already being 
exported to foreign countries, paper, sumi (ink-stick), fans, 
umbrellas, lacquer-ware, relief lacquer-ware, porcelain, dolls, 
fancy goods, bamboo-work, silk, silk cloth, books and other 
articles which foreign traders might desire to have should 
be offered in exchange for foreign goods. Chikuzan's sug-
gestions, it must be admitted, had much to commend them, 
as measures which would remedy the one-sidedness of trade 
. _._--_. --_._-. __ .- --- -----------
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in the period under consideration. 
In the Meiwa (1764-1771) and Anyei (1772-1780) eras, 
Ezo, a region where Japanese and Russian territories were 
contiguous began to claim the attention of Japanese scholars, 
many of whom urged the necessity of developing the re-
sources of the district. The Aka Ezo Fusetsu Ko ".,/jliil.ilJI:'!1, 
a book written by Kudo-Heisuke I)lIlFJ<l!/J, may well be re-
garded as the first publication advocating the opening of 
the country to foreign intercourse. Influenced by the views 
set forth in it, the Tokugawa Shogunate carried out a 
survey of Ezo and Karafuto in the fifth and sixth years of 
Temmei (1785 and 1786). In the Seiiki Monogatari i'!illil:4I4iill, 
and the Keisid Hisaku ~q1i<, which were written by Honta-
Toshiaki "'~"IjWJ in the Kansei era (1789-1800), the author 
expounded his progressive views in support of the opening 
of the country to foreign trade and intercourse. In addition 
to stressing the need of increasing national wealth through 
the development of foreign trade, he urged not only the 
exploitation of the resources of Ezo but the subjugation of 
the neighbouring lands. In Toshiaki's opinion, no country 
could live in economic isolation. Pointing out that all 
European countries grew richer and stronger by obtaining 
from other countries what they did not possess at home, he 
declared that it was a great mistake for Japan to pursue 
an exclusionist policy and to remain isolated from the out-
side world. .. As Japan is a sea-girt country," he said, "it 
should be the first care of the Ruler to develop shipping 
and trade. Through sending her ships to all countries, 
Japan should import such goods as are useful at home, as 
well as gold, silver and copper, to replenish her resources. 
The country will grow weaker and weaker, if it remains 
contented with the policy of supplying its needs exclusively 
with its own products. The weaker the country, the heavier 
will become the burden on the farmers, with the natural 
result that the farming population will become increasingly 
impoverished." From this point of view, he emphasised the 
need of foreign trade, and denounced the idea of self-suf-
--------- ---
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ficiency. The prevalent view in those days was that in 
foreign trade one party gained while the other party lost, 
but Toshiaki did not support this contention. He said: 
"Some people rightly contend that the only way to enrich 
a country is to get as much gold, silver and copper as 
possible from other countries, but this will not be feasible 
unless home products are exported in exchange for foreign 
gold, silver and copper. There should be no discrimination 
in treatment as between home and foreign products, and 
trade should be carried on an equal footing. Such being 
the case, one party will derive as much profit from trade 
as the other." Arguing in this way, he stressed the point 
that trade is beneficial to both parties, upholding the rule 
that the parties to trade should stand on an equal footing. 
He also described trade as a war carried on by peaceful 
means, pointing out that: "Foreign trade is a war in that 
each party seeks to extract wealth from the other." Pro· 
ceeding, he said: "Up to 140 or 150 years ago, Japan often 
sent her ships abroad to trade with foreign countries. If, 
following this precedent, government vessels are now built 
and sent abroad to import the goods which are useful to 
Japan, the country will not have to depend on Chinese and 
Dutch ships visiting Nagasaki for the supply of such goods." 
If his suggestion were to be acted upon and trade carried 
on actively, the development of the Japanese shipping in· 
dustry was an absolute necessity. Such development of the 
shipping business was only possible in those days if the 
Government undertook to build the ships and to operate the 
carrying trade. It was for this reason that Toshiaki ad· 
vanced the theory of State operation of maritime enterprise. 
It argues high statesmanship on his part that he took so 
strong a stand for the opening of the country and the 
development of trade at a time when exclusionism was the 
rule. 
---------.---~.-~- -.---
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2. VIEWS ON OVERSEAS TRADE IN THE CLOSING 
DAYS OF THE TOKUGAWA SHOGUNATE 
When Commodore Perry visited this country in June of 
the sixth year of Kaei (1853), and presented the Note from 
his Government addressed to the Shogunate, which demanded 
the conclusion of a treaty of amity and commerce, it at 
once became a matter of urgent necessity for the Shogunate 
to decide whether to keep the country closed or to open it. 
Various views were then expressed in many quarters both 
for and against foreign trade. On July 1st of the same 
year, the Shogunate forwarded a Japanese translation of the 
American Note, communicated to them by Commodore 
Perry, to all Hans and sought an unreserved expression of 
their views on the advisability or otherwise of inaugurating 
trade relations with foreign countries. Many Hans submitted 
views opposed to the inauguration of foreign trade, but 
some, including the Fukuoka Han, urged the Shogunate to 
encourage foreign trade, on the ground that it would surely 
bring prosperity to the country. The Hikone Han went so 
far as to advise the Shogunate to go one step further and 
to send Japanese ships abroad for purposes of trade. In its 
memorial dated August 29th of the sixth year of Kaei, the 
Hikone Han suggested that Japanese merchantmen should 
be sent to J acatra (Batavia) to trade with Dutch firms there, 
saying that it was only natural that all countries should 
seek to supply their wants through trade.' 
In March of the first year of Ansei (1854), a treaty of 
amity and commerce was concluded between Japan and 
America, and this was soon followed by the conclusion of 
similar treaties with Britain, Russia and Holland. Under 
these treaties, trade was carried on in a small way taking 
chiefly the form of supplying the immediate needs of foreign 
shipping. Japan now experienced a new kind of trade 
different from that which had been carried on through 
* cf. E. Honjo, The Views of Various Hans on the Opening of the 
Country, Kyoto University Economic Review, No.!. Vol. XI. 1,936. 
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Nagasaki with China and Holland and was able to gain 
some idea of the meaning of international amity and com· 
merce. In a notification issued to all Hans on August 4th 
of the third year of Ansei, the roju (Ministry of the Shoo 
gunate), while admitting the propriety of the course urged 
in some quarters of sending Japanese ships to foreign coun· 
tries to engage in profitable trade with a view to making 
the country stronger and richer, suggested that, as it would 
take five to seven years to complete the necessary prepara· 
tions, the basic methods of trade should be studied carefully 
in the meantime, especially as the domestic supply of copper 
was diminishing annually due to heavy outflow. From this 
notification it can be gathered that the Shogunate was 
aware of the necessity of dispatching Japanese ships abroad 
for purposes of trade. 
In a memorial submitted to the Shogunate under date 
of August 15th of the same year, the Uraga and Hakodate 
bugyo (administrators), who were in Edo (Tokyo), after 
pointing out the evils attending trade carried on at Naga· 
saki with China and Holland, emphasised the necessity of 
copying the methods of trade practised by foreign countries. 
Citing the case of England, which was rich and strong, 
despite the fact of its location in latitudes further north 
than the southern part of Ezo, they attributed its wealth 
and strength to its shipping and commercial activity, declar· 
ing that if Japan should develop her trade in the right way, 
much profit would certainlY accrue. So long, however, as 
Japan confined her trade to transactions with foreign ships 
visiting this country, they asserted, it would be unwise to 
anticipate much profit. They were therefore in favour of 
dispatching Japanese ships to foreign countries for purposes 
of trade. A memorial submitted by ometsuke and metsuke 
officials in charge of coastal defence, in March of the fourth 
year of Ansei (1857), also stressed the urgent need of 
placing national finance on a secure basis through an active 
development of foreign trade. They suggested, inter alia, 
that Japanese merchantmen should be sent to all foreign 
, 
-----------~ 
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countries for trading purposes. 
The foreign countries which desired trade with Japan 
were naturally not contented with an arrangement, which 
merely enabled their ships to obtain in Japan such supplies 
as they lacked. In October of the fourth year of Ansei, 
Harris, the American Consul-General, visited Edo and be-
sought the Shogunate to agree to the conclusion of a com-
mercial treaty, to the stationing of an American Minister in 
Japan and to the opening of direct trade between Japanese 
and American merchants. The Shogunate circulated the 
American overtures in many quarters with a view to secur-
ing advice. Many of the recommendations submitted in 
response favoured the dispatch of Japanese merchantmen 
abroad for the purpose of engaging in active trade. For 
instance, the Fukui Han, in a memorial submitted under 
date of November 26th of the same year, declared that as 
no country could be strong without being rich, Japan 
should make positive efforts to promote trade "by making 
full use of her topographical advantages, so that she might 
become the richest country in the world." It even advocated 
the annexation of certain small countries with a view to 
pushing trade more vigorously. In another memorial dated 
February 18th of the fifth year of Ansei, the same Han 
insisted that Japan should inaugurate shipping services and 
dispatch traders to China and Western countries. The 
Tokushima Han also urged the necessity of sending out 
Japanese ships to carryon an energetic programme of 
foreign trade, declaring that the situation then prevailing 
was decreed by Heaven. The Kagoshima Han similarly 
emphasised the need to open up trade relations with other 
countries and to dispatch Japanese vessels to all foreign 
ports with a view to establishing Japan's commercial rights 
everywhere in the world. Hotta-Masayoshi ~I!IIEIM!, a roju, 
expressed similar views in his memorial. 
In March of the first year of Manyen (1860), the 
omelsuke and melsuke officials in charge of foreign affairs 
memorialised the Shogunate suggesting the advisability of 
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establishing a Bureau called the sambutsukala i!Il'!!l1i (Pro-
ducts Office). Their idea was to cause this Bureau to 
investigate the actual quantities of the various commodities 
produced in the country. "If Japanese ships are then sent 
to China; as we have previously recommended," they con-
tended, "they will be able to take orders from Chinese 
merchants with confidence." The views submitted by the 
kanjo bugyo and kanjo gimmiyaku officials were to the effect 
that, as foreign trade had already been inagurated, it was 
not sufficient for Japan to trade merely with the foreign 
merchantmen who visited the country. "It would be to 
Japan's interest to send investigators to Hongkong and other 
foreign ports to study the actual state of foreign trade 
abroad," they maintained. They further mentioned that, 
unlike Western goods, Chinese products include many useful 
articles such as gauze, damask, crepe, yarns and drugs, and 
that if these were imported, the shortage in the Japanese 
domestic products could be made good. This was particu-
-larIy necessary, they said, as it was reported that few 
Chinese ships had recently been visiting Nagasaki. It would 
prove beneficial to China also, as Japanese ships would 
carry to that country such goods as were in demand there. 
From this point of view, these memorialists advised the 
Shogunate to arrange for the dispatch of Japanese merchant-
men to China. The gaikoku bugyo (administrators in charge 
of foreign affairs) also supported the dispatch of Japanese 
vessels to China as "timely and appropriate," and so did 
machibugyo officials. Judging from the recommendations 
made by the kanjo bugyo and gaikoku bugyo officials, it is 
clear that advisability of sending Japanese ships to China 
for trading purposes had been under discussion in official 
quarters for some years. It was, of course, chiefly from the 
point of view of promoting trade that the step was urged, 
but the idea of increasing national armaments, or of ex-
panding the Navy, had some relation to the problem of 
developing trade, a fact which merits some attention. 
Sakuma-Shozan ~j\,/lIlllnq also referred to the benefits accru-
.. - .. ~ -.---
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ing from active trade, in the course of a memorial which 
he submitted to the Shogunate in the 2nd year of Bunkyu 
(1862). 
3. A PLAN TO DISPATCH SHOGUNATE OFFICIALS 
ABROAD 
Prior to the presentation by Harris, the American 
Consul·General, to the Shogunate of the important proposal 
for the conclusion of a treaty of amity and commerce, to 
which reference has already been made, various opinions 
had already been expressed by the shogunate officials on 
the general question of inaugurating foreign trade and the 
methods to be adopted. On August 18th of the fourth year 
of Ansei, the Shogunate sought the views of the members 
of the hyojosho and other high officials with regard to its 
plan to dispatch officials to Hongkong to study methods of 
trade. The members of the hyojosho, while endorsing the 
idea of sending Japanese ships to foreign ports for purposes 
of trade, stated that" the dispatch of a Japanese ship on a 
mere cruise to Hongkong disguised as a Dutch vessel," as 
indicated in the Shogunate's proposal, would be useless. 
They maintained that if any good result was to be obtained, 
the Shogonate officials to be dispatched must remain at 
Hongkong for some time in order to make a careful study 
of trading methods. The ometsuke and metsuke officials 
supported the plan to send officials to Hongkong, hailing 
the dispatch of Japanese ships abroad for purposes of trade 
as an undertaking calculated to strengthen and enrich the 
country. The kanjo bugyo and kanjo gimmiyaku officials in 
charge of coastal defence, on the other hand,· disapproved 
of the plan, on the ground that the proposed investigation 
concerning trade would be attended with great difficulties 
and that consequently the project would be fruitless. 
Hayashi-Daigaku-no-Kami fI'*.liJI supported the project as 
timely. Tsutsui-Masanori 1Ill;l/'lElIl, the yan bugyo, suggested 
that a prior understanding should be reached with the 
-~'-------------------------------------------------------
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foreign authorities concerned regarding the landing Japanese 
officials in a foreign port. Due to this division of opinion, 
the plan finally failed to materialise. In any case, the fact 
that such a plan was seriously discussed shows that the 
question of inaugurating foreign trade was no longer a con-
troversial issue and that the real problem was one of the 
methods to be adopted. This testifies also to the fact that 
there was a steady development of the desire to copy foreign 
trading practice and to send Japanese ships abroad to carry 
on active trade, instead of clinging to the passive methods 
of the past. 
4. THE AMUR TRADING EXPEDITION OF THE 
KAMEDA MARU 
In January of the fifth year of Ansei, a Japan-American 
commercial treaty of 14 articles and trade regulations con-
sisting of seven articles were drawn up by agreement and 
these were signed by the Governments of the two countries 
in June. Similar treaties were signed with Holland, Russia 
and Britain in July and with France in September of the 
same year. As trade with foreign countries became more 
general certain unfavourable effects began to be noted in 
many directions. Above all there resulted a shortage 
domestic supplies, and the prices of commodities rose in 
consequence. This situation caused the Hakodate bugyo to 
devise a plan, whereby Japan was to send her ships abroad 
for trading purposes instead of confining herself to trading 
with such foreign ships as visited her shores. The cost of 
maintaining these trading ships, it was proposed, should be 
defrayed out of the profits accruing from the trade itself. 
He hoped that by this means Japan would be able not only 
to acquire knowledge regarding conditions abroad but to 
train her captains and seamen. This plan was laid before 
the Shogunate in the sixth year of Ansei in a memorial, 
above the ioint signatures of Hori-Oribe-no-Sho 1!iIIIIIlliSIE and 
three other officials. 
-----------~ 
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After describing the distress caused to the people, high 
and low, by the sharp rise in commodity prices attendant 
on the inauguration of foreign trade, the memorial pro-
ceeded: "But since all countries are carrying on trade as 
the best means of enriching themselves, Japan should do 
likewise, for she will certainly profit by trade, provided she 
carries it on by the right methods. If, however, Japan, due 
to her previous exclusionist policy, remains ignorant of 
appropriate trading methods, simply doing what she is told 
by others, confining herself exclusively to trading with such 
foreign ships as may visit the country, the results will 
prove very inimical to her interests. It is, therefore, pre-
ferable for her to dispatch her ships abroad to import such 
foreign goods as are needed by this country." They further 
remarked: .. We understand that Americans and other 
citizens of the countries with which Japan has already con-
cluded commercial treaties have their commercial head-
quarters in Shanghai and Hongkong. Although Japan has 
not yet signed a commercial treaty with China, no objection 
is likely to be raised by that country to the dispatch of 
Japanese trading ships to these ports, as Chinese merchant-
men have hitherto been visiting Nagasaki." Referring to 
Russia, they remarked: "Russia has established her sway 
over Manchuria, a r~gion which is contiguous to Ezo, and 
it is said that many Russians have alreadY settled in the 
district along the Amur and a commercial mart has been 
opened at a place called Nikolaevsk." Stressing the need 
to investigate conditions in these districts, they urged: "As, 
fortunately, a commercial treaty has already been concluded 
with Russia, a Japanese ship should be sent, nominally for 
trading purposes, as far as the Amur and Kamchatka to 
import the products of these districts, giving in exchange 
such Japanese goods as are not obtainable there. Such a 
transaction will prove beneficial to this country." They 
expressed the desire to send out a ship in the summer of 
the same year, if possible, and asked permission to carry 
out this plan. 
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The kanjo bug yo and kanjo gimmiyaku officials of the 
Shogunate considered Hakodate bugyo's plan. They expres· 
sed the view that although the plan had much to commend 
it, it was better to defer the proposed dispatch of a 
Japanese ship to the Amur and Kamchatka until "a more 
appropriate time." The plan to send Japanese ships to 
Hongkong, however, met with their approval, for they said: 
"With regard to the dispatch of ships to China for trading 
proposes, the ometsuke and metsuke officials in charge of 
foreign affairs submitted the other day their agreed opinion 
in support of this course. Hongkong is now a British pos· 
session, but it was Chinese territory before, and though it 
is an island, it is located close to the mainland of China. 
Unlike Manchuria and Kamchatka, international trade is 
carried on actively there, and it will be profitable for Japan 
to dispatch her ships to that port." In the recommendations 
made by the gaikoku bugyo officials after taking counsel 
among themselves, it was urged that: "It is advisable for 
the Shogunate to dispatch its own vessels or foreign ships 
chartered for the purpose to Russian territory near Ezo, to 
begin with laden with Japanese goods likely to find a market 
there, and then afterwards to arrange for the dispatch of 
ships to Shanghai and Hongkong. Such a course will not 
only help to expand domestic production but will sometimes 
bring enormous profits to this country." They also suggested 
that in dispatching a Japanese ship to Hongkong, the 
Shogunate should previously secure the consent of the 
British Minister in this country, as Hongkong was British 
territory. After studying these recommendations, the roju 
adopted the course recommended by the Hakodate bugyo, 
and sent a Japanese ship to the Amur, with the double 
object of carrying on trade and of inspecting conditions 
in Manchuria and looking into the border situation. 
The Hakodate bugyo's plan was finally accepted by the 
Shogunate, as is clear from his letter dated February 
9th acknowledging receipt of the Shogunate's notice of 
sanction. 
----------------
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Thus, the Hakodate bugyo sent out the Kameda Maru 
11111"" in April of the same year. The ship set sail from 
Hakodate on April 28th with Midzuno-ShOdayu >l<!lfIE*:I<, 
Takeda-Ayasaburoiitm'll!"'R~ and other officials, their attendants, 
a crew of twenty, one merchant and a Russian interpreter, 
a resident of Hakodate, on board, and arrived at De 
Castrie on May 7th_ She made the port of Nikolaevsk 
on June 1st, and leaving there on July 16th, returned to 
Hakodate on August 9th_ The Kameda Maru was built 
by a shipright named Tsudzuki-Toyoji H~ to the order 
of the Hakodate bugyo_ Construction was started in March 
of the fifth year of Ansei and the ship was completed in 
October of the following year_ She was a 46-ton wooden 
ship of the schooner type, with two masts. She carried a 
cargo of silk fabric, rice, soy, potatoes and a quantity of 
sundry goods, which she sold at Nikolaevsk_ After study-
ing geographical conditions and customs and manners as 
well as the prospects of trade, the voyagers returned to 
Hakodate on August 9th_ It is recorded in an old docu-
ment that she was "the first foreign-style ship built in 
Japan to go abroad for purposes of trade." 
5. THE SENZAI MARU'S TRADE WITH SHANGHAI 
In February of the first year of Bunkyu (1861), the 
Shogunate sought the views of the officials in charge of 
foreign affairs on various points in connection with its 
scheme to send officials to Hongkong with the double object 
of carrying on trade and studying foreign trading methods. 
The 6metsuke and melsuke officials accordingly held con-
ferences and submitted their conclusions to the Shogunate 
in March. Their conclusions were that it was hardly worth 
while to send officials to Hongkong for the purposes in-
dicated in the Shogunate's plan_ While admitting that 
Hongkong was a prosperous place which was visited by 
many foreign ships, they said that it was only a small 
island and that the ships which visited it did so simply for 
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the purpose of replenishing their depleted supplies. On the 
other hand, they described Shanghai as a port where trade 
was carried on actively, and recommended the dispatch of 
officials to that port, instead of to Hongkong. They at the 
same time suggested the advisability of chartering a Dutch 
ship and employing a Dutch crew for the purpose. Their 
reason was that as no Japanese merchantman had ever 
been sent to Shanghai, it was better to make believe that 
the ship dispatched by the Shogunate was a Dutch vessel. 
After reaching an understanding with the Dutch Consul at 
Kanagawa through the local bugyo, they suggested that 
officials should be sent on the chartered ship to study 
matters relative to trade, navigation, etc. The recommenda· 
tions submitted by the bugyo officials in charge of foreign 
affairs in April also discountenanced the dispatch of officials 
to Hongkong. They pointed out that Hongkong had no 
products of its own and that the goods handled there were 
all brought from other countries-practically the same kinds 
of goods as were being brought to the Japanese ports by 
foreign vessels. As, moreover, Japanese currency did not 
correspond with foreign currencies, they argued, that the 
failure of the undertaking to produce, profits might adver-
sely affect the interest of Japanese merchants in the trade. 
They recommended, threfore, that a commercial treaty 
should first be concluded with China and that after due 
study of the customs and manners of China by Japanese 
Envoy, Japanese merchantmen should be dispatched to that 
country. 
Later, the Shogunate issued to the Nagasaki bugyo in· 
structions, which, in part, stated that: .. The Shogunate 
proposes to send a ship to Shanghai and Hongkong, with 
officials on board, to carryon trade by way of an experi· 
ment, while simultaneously making a study the state of 
foreign trade in these ports. Its scheme is to charter a 
Dutch ship, together with its crew, at Nagasaki, and to 
send it with a cargo of the marine products which you 
have in store. You are, therefore, asked to investigate 
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matters relative to the charterage of a Dutch ship and the 
general method carrying on trade in China, and to report 
the results." 
In compliance with these instructions, the Nagasaki 
bugyo, Okabe-Suruga·no·Kami IlIIllIIIIlPl,"" made the necessary 
inquiries at a Dutch firm at Dejima, as a result, he learned 
that charterage for a sailing ship, of about 300 tons burden 
inclusive of wages for the crew, and other charges, would 
be about $1,600 per month, and that pilotage at Shanghai 
would cost something like $100. Trade by merchants of 
non·treaty countries was allowed at Shanghai, provided the 
regular port dues were paid. In case a Dutch ship was 
chartered, the Dutch Consul at Shanghai might be asked by 
letter to see that all went well. Hongkong being British 
territory, no port dues were charged there, but if a ship 
was to be chartered for a voyage to that port, which is 
farther off than Shanghai, charterage would naturally be 
higher. As regards suitable articles for the Shanghai 
market, it was difficult to say for certain what kinds of 
goods would find a good market there, as various kinds of 
Japanese goods· had lately been finding their way into 
Shanghai, though it could confidently be said that the ship· 
ment of coal would entail no loss. As weather conditions 
were unfavourable for a voyage at that time of the year, it 
would be advisable to defer the dispatch of a ship until 
winter. Such was the information which he obtained, and 
in communicating it to the Shogunate, the bugyo submitted 
his own opinion. He gave it as his opinion that as this 
was an innovation for Japan, a Dutch ship should be 
chartered, and some officials, an interpreter and merchants 
should be sent on board, with a small quantity of Japanese 
products, to inspect conditions and to investigate trade 
methods there. He however advised the Shogunate to defer 
the dispatch of a Japanese ship till a later date. 
Instructions were then issued to the Nagasaki bugyo to 
arrange for the chartering of a ship and other matters. 
Accordingly, in March of the following year (second year 
- - --- --- ----- -- --~~- --------
JAPAN'S OVERSEAS TRADE IN THE TOKVGAWA PERIOD 17 
of Bunkyu), the bugyo inspected a Dutch ship (270 tons; 
charterage, $1,300 per month) and a British ship (600 tons; 
charterage, ~3,OOO per month), which were then at anchor 
in the port of Nagasaki; but the idea of chartering a 
foreign vessel was later given up, and it was decided to 
buy one instead. Thus, the British ship Armistice was 
finally purchased. This ship, which was built in 1855 
(second year of Ansei) at Sunderland, England, was a three· 
masted wooden vessel, 126 feet overall, 28 feet in beam 
with a draught of 17 feet, and cargo capacity of 358 tons. 
It was owned by an Englishman named Henry Richardson, 
who, as the captain of the ship, had been engaged in the 
carrying business between Shanghai and Nagasaki for two 
years. making enormous profits in this business. When 
this ship entered the port of Nagasaki on March 12th, 
officials of the local bugyo's office inspected it and a con· 
tract was signed for the purchase of the ship, together with 
all its equipment, for $34,000. As her departure from 
Nagasaki on another voyage had already been fixed for 
March 14th, it was arranged that she should be handed 
over to the purchasers at the end of this voyage. She reo 
turned to Nagasaki on April 11th, and three days later, the 
Nagasaki bug yo, Takahashi·Mimasaka·no·Kami IM!!~tF';"f, ac· 
companied by metsuke and other officials, inspected the 
ship, and changed her name to the Senzai Maru f"it:IL. On the 
payment of the purchase money on the 18th, the Rising 
Sun flag was run up to the top of her mast. * 
Thus, the Shogunate initiated trade with Shanghai 230 
years after the country had been closed to foreign inter· 
course, in the era of Kanyei. Altogether 51 Japanese went 
to Shanghai on board the Senzai Maru, namely, five Edo 
officials, three officials of the Shogunate's Nagasaki office, 
seven local officials of Nagasaki. three Nagasaki merchants, 
.. Mossman, New Japan, Lond. 1873. p. 144. 
Paske-Smith, Western Barbarians in Japan and Formosa in Tokugawa 
Days, Kobe. 1930. p. 222-223. 
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23 attendants and ten seamen. The party also included a 
Dutch merchant, who was temporarily employed for this 
trade mission. The captain and the British crew of the 
Armistice, as the Senzai Maru was formerly called, operated 
the ship. The Senzai Maru sailed from Nagasaki on April 
29th and arrived at Shanghai on the morning of May 6th, 
covering a distance of 572 miles in eight days. On her 
homeward voyage, she left Shanghai on July 5th and re-
turned to Nagasaki eleven days later. The time taken up 
by this Shanghai trade, from the ship's departure from 
Nagasaki to her return to the port, was 75 days. 
Although Chinese trade with Japan had been carried 
on at Nagasaki, Japan had never before sent a ship to a 
Chinese port to trade with that country. Since there was 
no commercial treaty between the two countries, the conduct 
of this trade was virtually entrusted to the Dutch Consul 
at Shanghai. The Chinese authorities raised no objection 
on the ground that it was conducted under Dutch manage-
ment. All goods were treated as Dutch commodities. The 
unloaded cargo was put into the warehouse of the Dutch 
Consulate, for which rent was paid. All commercial trans-
actions were left in the hands of members of the Dutch 
Consular staff, to whom 2.5 per cent. of the values of the 
goods sold or purchased was paid as commission. Certain 
rates of commission were also paid to Chinese middlemen. 
The Senzai Maru's cargo consisted of coal, ginseng, 
dried sea-slug, dried sea-ear, dried sea-weed, tangle, lacquer-
ware, isinglass, camphor, textiles, etc., but it appears that these 
commodities did not find a good market at Shanghai. Ac-
cording to certain historical records, whereas tangle brought 
in a profit of about 10 per cent_ and isinglass a profit of 
3.4 per cent., the camphor was disposed of at a loss of 14.7 
per cent. Some commodities had to be disposed of at a 
heavy loss on the eve of the ship's departure for home. 
Altogether, it appears that no profit accrued from this 
trade. 
According to a book written by Paske-Smith, the total 
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quantity of the goods carried by the ship to Shanghai was 
600 tons. From Shanghai, the Senzai Maru brought home 
various kinds of goods including printed cotton, rugs, 
mercury, sugar, etc. 
Besides providing $3,000 for the operation of this trade 
at the outset, the Shogunate remitted $27,000 to the Dutch 
Consulate at Shanghai, so that the total outlay amounted to 
$30,000. As the goods brought home were all purchases 
made by the merchants, the $30,000 referred to evidently 
covered the cost of the voyage and hotel and other ex· 
penses. 
6. A PLAN TO SEND THE KENJUN MARU TO 
HONGKONG AND BAT A VIA 
The Hakodate bug yo, who sent a trading ship to Niko· 
laevsk in April of the first year of Bunkyu, conceived 
another plan to dispatch the Kenjun Maru, a ship belonging 
to his office, to Hongkong and Batavia, but this scheme did 
not materialise. 
The Kenjun Maru III!JIiIJL was originally an American ship 
named the Altair, which was built at Fairhaven, America, 
in the third year of Ansei (1856). She was bought when 
she made the port of Hakodate in August of the first year 
of Bunkyu (1861). At first, the Hakodate bugyo memorialised 
the Shogunate urging it to build a warship, but his memorial 
was not adopted. In the spring of the first year of Bun· 
kyu, he memorialised the Shogunate again asking for per· 
mission to build a warship for the purpose of strengthening 
his defences against a Northern foe, and this time his request 
was granted. . Consequently, the bugyo collected building 
materials and all preparations were completed for starting 
shipbuilding work. At that time, the Kameda Maru came 
across the Altair at Nikolaevsk, and as this American ship 
was found to answer the bugyo's requirements in point of 
size and mechanical appliances, negotiations were opened 
with its owners for its purchase. In such circumstances, 
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the plan to build a new warship was abandoned, and the 
Altair was purchased at the price of $22,000 from the 
American owner, when she entered the port of Hakodate. 
She was a three-masted wooden sailing ship of 378 tons, 
119 feet in length, with a 29.1 foot beam and 12.2 foot 
draught. She was renamed the Kenjun Maru. 
In March of the second year of Bunkyu, the bugyo in 
charge of foreign affairs wrote to the British Minister in-
forming him of the plan to dispatch the Kenjun Maru to 
Hongkong to trade and soliciting the good offices of the 
British Consul at Hongkong on her behalf. The letter, which 
was dated March 28th, said in part: "As they are going 
to a strange port to trade and as, moreover, they have little 
knowledge of the methods of trade, we shall be greatly 
obliged, if you will kindly see to it that the Consul of your 
country at Hongkong gives them the necessary help and 
advice. Officers in the Hakodate bugyo's service are being 
sent with the party to manitain order on board the ship. 
As the ship is to sail shortly, you will please communicate 
our request to the British Consul at that port." The 
British Minister wanted to have a written request from 
the roju about the matter, and so the roju wrote 
to him under date of May 4th. The bugyo in charge 
of foreign affairs addressed a similar letter of request 
to the Dutch Consul-General under date of March 28th, 
bespeaking the good offices of the Dutch Consul at 
Batavia. On September 22nd, the British Consul addressed 
an inquiry to the Hakodate bugyo as to the date of the 
departure of the Kenjun Maru, to which the latter replied 
that although the date of the ship's departure had not been 
definitely fixed yet, she would probably set sail within a 
week or ten days. 
On October 6th of the scond year of Bunkyu, the Ken-
jun Mltru left the Hokkaido for Edo. The ship's company 
consisted of the captain and a few score people, and her 
cargo comprised tangIe, dried sea-sIug, dried sea-ear, sliced 
tangle, raw silk. etc. In November. however. the Kenjun 
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Maru was ordered to suspend her projected voyage and 
remain at anchor at Shinagawa. Nothing definite is known 
as to the cause of this decision. One theory has it that it 
was due to divided counsels, while another theory suggests 
the gravity of the situation then prevailing at home and 
abroad as the true cause. 
7. THE KENJUN MARU'S SHANGHAI TRADE 
Although the plan to dispatch the Kenjun Maru to 
Hongkong was definitely abandoned, the Shogunate infor· 
mally notified those concerned, in October of the third year 
of Bunkyu, that the ship might be sent to Nagasaki and 
then to Shanghai, if the wind was favourable. So, the ship 
left Shinagawa on November 11th and arrived at Hyogo on 
December 17th, where the requisite purchases of goods 
were made from merchants in Osaka and elsewhere. On 
February 9th of the following year (first year of Genji), she 
sailed from Hyogo. As she could not put in at Nagasaki 
on account of high winds and seas, she took her course 
westward to Shanghai, where she arrived on the 21st of 
the same month. The leading Japanese officials were then 
presented to the local Taotai by the British Consul. Trade 
was carried on through the good offices of the Dutch Con· 
suI, and after a month and a half's stay in that port she 
left for home on April 9th, arriving at Nagasaki on the 
15th. After calling at Hyogo, the ship returned to Shina· 
gawa on July 10th. 
The party consisted of Yamaguchi·Sudzujiro UHll!!;;1.:JlI\ 
and other officials of the Hakodate bugyo's office, two Hako· 
date merchants, and the ship's crew, a ship's company of 
over fifty all told. It is said that they took marine products 
from Hokkaido to Shanghai and brought hack sugar, raw 
cotton, mercury, etc. 
During their stay at Shanghai, they took the advice of 
the Dutch Consul in the matter of reports to the local 
Customs, in employing longshoremen, in hiring lighters, and 
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in warehousing their goods. They also learned from him 
particulars about Customs duties and warehouse rents. As 
in the case of the Senzai Maru a 2.5 per cent. commission 
(increased to four or five per cent. in some cases) was paid. 
They left all arrangements in these matters in the hands 
of the Du tch Consul. 
A big profit was evidently realized by the sale of dried 
sea-slug, dried sea-ear and sliced tangle, as there was a 
shortage of these commodities at Shanghai- Shell-ligaments 
and dried cuttle-fish, which are regarded as indispensable 
foodstuffs by the Chinese, also fetched good prices, because 
they were scarce there, due to the fact that most foreign 
ships which brought back these provisions from the Hok-
kaido passed on to Canton, without calling at Shanghai- In 
this trade, it is said, a profit of some 1,300 ryo was realized. 
This is in singular contrast with the poor results of the 
Senzai ·Maru's trade. 
8. CONCLUSION 
The Tokugawa period is historically known as the age 
of exclusionism, but the exclusionist policy of the Shogunate 
underwent a marked change in its closing decades. It was 
finally supplanted by the policy of opening the country, 
though foreign trade was at first confined to transactions 
with foreign ships visiting these shores. Later, however, 
the need of developing overseas trade was urged by many 
people, with the result that the Shogunate at one time con-
templated the dispatch of officials abroad to study trade 
problems. Finally, the dispatch of Japanese ships to foreign 
ports was defin itely undertaken. 
The Kameda Maru was the first Japanese ship to go 
abroad for the purpose of cultivating overseas trade. This 
ship, which was built in Japan, went to the Amur region 
under the command of a Japanese captain and manned by 
a crew of Japanese seamen. The Senzai Maru and the 
Kenjun Maru, which traded at Shanghai were both originally 
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foreign ships. While the Senzai Maru was operated by a 
foreign crew, the Kenjun Maru's crew was Japanese. The 
project once mooted to dispatch a Japanese ship to Hong· 
kong and Batavia, however, never materealised. 
It is not clear exactly what gains or losses resulted 
from the trade in the above·mentioned three instances, but 
the fact that this form of overseas trade was undertaken 
by Japanese ships is in itself of considerable significance. 
Not only does it indicate that Japan had passed from the 
era of trade at home ports into that of overseas trade, but 
it served the purpose of acquainting her with conditions 
abroad as well. That an overseas voyage was undertaken 
by a Japanese crew on a ship built in Japan is also a 
matter worthy of special mention in the annals of Japanese 
communications. Furthermore, a precedent was now esta-
blished for the purchase of foreign ships, which was later 
followed frequently by the Shogunate and the various Hans.' 
In short, while admitting that the overseas trade under-
taken by the Shogunate was the natural outcome of the 
new situation then developing, the courage shown in under-
taking it deserves appreciation. Due notice must also be 
taken of the fact that it produced many other beneficial 
results, both directly and indirectly . 
.. Paske-Smith, Western Barbarians in Japan and Formosa in Tokugawa 
Day., Kobe, 1930, P. 223. 
